Military analysis: Why the first phase of the Ukrainian offensive in Kherson failed – The two reasons and the bridgeheads

The long-awaited offensive of Ukrainian forces against the Russians, which began on August 29, continues in the southern sector in the direction of Kherson, following the following variations:

Initially, with the launch of the attack, the A-line forces of the Ukrainians rush forward, with the tanks and armored vehicles leading it, supported by the Himars PEPs, succeeding in creating despite the heavy losses they suffer, an important bridgehead south of Ingulez.

Kyiv is involving more and more forces

The attack takes place in five directions, with no initial progress in 4 of them, where both warring sides claim local victories without territorial gains

The only direction where the Ukrainian army could appreciably advance was towards Andriivka.

There, Ukrainian units were able to cross the Ingulez River and create a stable bridgehead on the southern bank, as we mentioned above, trying to widen it in width and depth

So by August 31, the Ukrainian troops succeeded in creating a deep penetration into the Russian defensive lines and advanced towards Bruskinske.

At the same time, significant Ukrainian forces found themselves in a de facto encirclement, under constant Russian bombardment.

Unable to receive reinforcements, the Ukrainian units retreated to Kostroma on 2 September, from where they made another push south.

On September 3, this entry ceased to exist due to lack of support

Although Kyiv currently controls the bridgehead at Andriivka, it is apparently unable to undertake further offensive advances. The troops appear to have suffered heavy casualties.

Further north, the Russians launched their own counterattack at Potyomkine

Therefore, the “track record” is more than controversial.

Even BILD editor Röpcke drew the “dry” conclusion on September 1st, according to which: “It seems as if the counterattack was unsuccessful”.

Overall, two main reasons are given for the quick end of the first offensive wave.

On the one hand, the Ukrainian units managed to create deep wedges in the Russian defensive location.

However the fact that they were not reinforced with forces and means resulted in their aggressive momentum being stopped gradually and them retreating before the risk of being encircled and destroyed by the superior Russian forces in terms of means and numbers.

Alongside the supply of Ukrainian troops across the Ingulez River is not guaranteed through the pontoons, which became an obvious target for Russian artillery, resulting in at least one pontoon being destroyed and most of the others under fire

The other problem with the Ukrainian counterattack is the terrain in the area. Kherson is very different from Donbass.

Donbass is dominated by forests and industrial settlements that provide good cover against artillery and airstrikes

Kherson, on the other hand, is steppe, absolutely flat land.

As a consequence of the above, the advanced armored phalanxes of the Ukrainians moving in undigested and completely uncovered terrain are an easy target for the Russian artillery and air force

Ukrainian wedges were relentlessly bombarded with TOS thermobaric munitions by the Russians

There are dozens of videos showing Ukrainian armored formations being shelled while moving through undigested and exposed terrain

Based on the available video alone, the losses of Ukrainian troops in this first week of the counteroffensive appear enormous.

Kyiv has imposed a total blackout on the “details” of the counterattack, but reports are circulating.

From Odessa and Mykolaiv, locals posted videos of entire phalanxes of ambulances carrying apparently injured people from the attack to the nearest hospitals.
The city authorities called on all citizens to urgently donate blood.

The 128th Special Mountain Rifle Brigade from Zakarpattia, which took part in the “Khersa Offensive”, apparently suffered such heavy casualties that the region declared September 2 a day of mourning.
How high the losses are “in specific numbers” remains unknown or secret.

Conclusions drawn

With control of the Andriivka bridgehead, after about a week of their attack, Ukrainian troops have gained ground, but apparently at the cost of heavy casualties, while in other parts the front remains largely static.

To boost the offensive, Kyiv is moving new forces into the region.

In the coming days, the second “attack wave” is likely to act in the Kherson steppe, which will be based on the Andriivka bridgehead.In this sense, some observers pointed out that the counterattack was insufficiently prepared, despite the lengthy announcements.

Sufficient reserves have not been built up, nor have the central units been equipped with anti-aircraft defenses such as the German “Gepard” anti-aircraft tanks.

Britain’s Evening Standard writes that Zelensky allegedly ordered the attack to begin “against the clear advice of his military officers.”

For Zelensky, the attack apparently had “more symbolic-political value than military”.

The Ukrainian army was not yet sufficiently equipped “with tactical and strategic reserves” for this attack

Nevertheless, Selensky ordered the advance “because he fears that the deadlock at the front will undermine the support of the allies.”

Another interpretation of why the counter-offensive may have started too hastily is the deliveries of Iranian drones to Russian troops, after earlier it was known that Moscow acquired up to 1000 drones from Tehran

The Washington Post has now reported that drone deliveries have indeed begun. A White House spokeswoman said in unison that Tehran sent Mohajer-6 and Shahed attack drones on the first missions in late August.

If this is true, Iranian attack drones should soon be used on the front lines.
Especially over the Kherson Steppe they could inflict heavy losses on advancing units, since they would have neither cover nor camouflage on the flat land.

It is possible that Kyiv launched the Kherson counteroffensive so hastily because it wanted to regain as much ground as possible before the Iranian drones arrived, wanting to cross the Kherson steppe all the way to the Dnieper, according to the interpretation.

Assessment

From the above it is clear that the Ukrainian attack in the south has turned into static attempts, which is a clear indication that it has been intercepted by Russian forcess.

The Russian forces put up a strong resistance, relying on the volume of forces they had already assembled on the Kherson front, as well as their artillery superiority.

The development of the businesses we mentioned above verifies the assessment of our previous article, that the Ukrainian attack it will gradually lose its initial momentum and effectiveness, which leads to the fact that it will eventually be limited and degenerate into aggressive operations of small power and scale with commensurate profits.

In any case, even so, the Ukrainians will have succeeded in significantly reducing the strength of the Russian Forces in the Kherson region, which will have to be regrouped and then replaced after the end of the operations, by other fresh Russian forces

The major issue for the Ukrainians, however, is after the end of their specific offensive action in Kherson, what forces they will have as a reserve, in order to continue to put up an effective defense against the Russians.

Our assessment is that the attack of the Ukrainians in Kherson is similar to that of the Germans at the end of the Second World War in the Ardennes, which was also their last ambitious offensive flash on the western front, before they were crushed by the USA-UK .