Why do we want the EYP? Or else, there’s a fly in the whiskey

Why do we want the EYP? Or else, there’s a fly in the whiskey
Why do we want the EYP? Or else, there’s a fly in the whiskey

The role and usefulness of the EYP and the monitoring of the mobile phone of Nikos Androulakis.

Of course, I do not agree with dear Nikos Alivizato about the ease with which he ends up proposing the resignation of the prime minister in the shadow of the “scandal” of the known surveillance. Should Mitsotakis leave so who can come? I’d be curious to know. And indeed to resign before all clarifications are given regarding the content and essence of the relevant case. Which I’m guessing from context and general political experience is of minor importance to discuss such extreme scenarios as resignation. In other words, I cannot imagine what could be those matters of the highest national importance which could be handled (in any way) by Mr. Androulakis from his position and which would justify special intervention by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But since the monitoring was done, we can make some approximations. The most likely scenario in my opinion points to a mistake on the part of the original whistleblower who may have perceived issues of international trade affairs – for which lobbyists and middlemen constantly approach MEPs – as suspicious and perhaps harmful to our national interests (or the interests of third parties ) cases. If this is indeed the case, there is no need for the government to resign, as long as a few heads fall. In other words, it will be a routine case with perhaps the abuse of a means, but without saving and well for the purpose of violating the privacy of the political person. After all, this is how the Prime Minister’s apology makes sense. What else? Shall I burn you, my John, shall I anoint you with oil?

However, if the movements of the MEP, about which the EYP was informed, referred to a kind of conspiracy against the nation and the state, and even without the knowledge of the prime minister, then Mr. Androulakis himself must take a position on this, and of course resign the government as unable to control the extra-institutional actors who conduct foreign policy on its behalf.

The third case, discussed by political coffeehouse analysts like myself, is that a surveillance system was actually set up to politically exploit any fishable information in the run-up to a possible election, which I don’t think is very likely because of the timing of it. But if it is true even in the slightest, then we are facing a constitutional deviation.

But let’s get serious. If, in my opinion, there is a political issue, it concerns the EYP itself, its role and utility. If it does collect information concerning national security, what does it do with it (for now, it doesn’t even inform the prime minister)? Does he sell them on the spy market? Is he planning actions that protect us from great calamity but which we will never know because they are protected by privacy rules? Then how will she collect credit for her services?

Many of my friends say “but that’s how it goes with these agencies, it’s a necessary evil”. I mean, I answer when they protected us? In the Junta, in Cyprus, in the Ocalan case, in Putin’s natural gas, where did we throw all the money? And who guarantees me that a Tombras, a Maurikis, a Gryllakis, a Kalenderides are qualified to protect the nation from malicious predators (predators) or from coups, so that we can sleep peacefully (with our own benign software)? And where, I continue my questions, is the line between legality and violation of rights?

But the worst thing, I think, is that the existence of secret services is intertwined with institutional deviations and the parastatal, and how it addicts society and governments to, if not illegal, at least secretive behaviors, which all the “beneficiaries” tend to consider regular and part of an informal agreement of “partners” to defend democracy from itself. This secrecy can certainly extend to non-confidential aspects of public life, to the extent that democratic control has always been troublesome for those who exercised and exercise the various forms of power with its variations. That is why commercial, defense, investment, energy, etc. agreements can be concluded, which, if they were open to public debate, would possibly fall into traps and insurmountable obstacles. Despite this, opengov (transparency) was legislated at the same time, which of course quickly degenerated into its opposite because no one believed it. The small conclusion is that governance is not done with bills. The big conclusion is that it is time to rethink the constitutional exclusion of “big brother”.

The article is in Greek

Tags: EYP fly whiskey

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